Russia has designated the New York-based Human Rights Foundation (HRF) as an “undesirable organisation”, expanding a campaign that has increasingly targeted international rights groups, independent media outlets and foreign universities.
It has been revealed by the office of the Prosecutor General of Russia on Thursday, August 6th, and announced internationally on Friday. It is headed by Yulia Navalnaya, wife of Alexei Navalny, a leading Russian opposition politician. This designation by Moscow means that now Human Rights Foundation can not continue working in Russia and makes Russians who will collaborate with the organization or provide any support to the activities of HRF, including sharing its content, to risk legally. The decision is important not only because of human rights activities of HRF on an international level, but also because of the role of Navalnaya in the opposition movement in Russia.
Since the death of her husband, she became one of the most noticeable figures challenging the government of Vladimir Putin from abroad. It is because Navalnaya heads HRF, the organization directly linked to the political campaign of Navalny, whose destruction the Kremlin tried many times.
The designation also shows how Moscow’s definition of a threat to national security has broadened. Organisations that document political repression, criticise Russia’s war policy, advocate sanctions or maintain contact with Russian civil society can now be placed in the same legal category as groups accused of espionage or direct interference in state affairs.
Moscow’s accusations against HRF
The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office cited HRF’s research and advocacy activities as the principal reasons for the decision. Among the allegations was the foundation’s classification of Russia as a “fully authoritarian regime” in its Tyranny Tracker project.
The launch of Tyranny Tracker in 2026 by HRF is an interactive research project aimed at evaluating the political systems of countries and territories based on how they embrace democratic ideals. It would seem that the classification of Russia in the project has been highly offending to the Russian officials as it goes contrary to the stance of the Kremlin that Russia is a sovereign democracy protecting itself from Western involvement. Russian prosecutors also claimed that HRF invested much money in spreading the information that discredits the Russian army. The term “discrediting” in the case is associated with a crime introduced and extended after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022.
The prosecutor’s office further alleged that HRF promotes anti-Russian sanctions, assists the United States in developing sanctions recommendations against Russian citizens and supports other organisations already declared “undesirable” in Russia. It also accused the foundation of attempting to track financial flows from Russia with the aim of helping freeze Russian assets abroad.
These accusations reflect the Kremlin’s increasingly expansive interpretation of foreign-funded human-rights activity. In Moscow’s official narrative, sanctions advocacy, documentation of abuses and cooperation with civil-society groups are not separate activities. They are presented as parts of a coordinated foreign effort to weaken the Russian state.
The authorities have not publicly produced evidence demonstrating that HRF operates a covert network inside Russia or that its programmes constitute a direct security threat. The allegations are part of the official justification for the designation and have been rejected by the foundation.
HRF says Moscow confirmed its assessment
HRF Chief Legal and Policy Officer Javier El-Hage responded by arguing that the Russian decision had strengthened, rather than undermined, the foundation’s assessment of the Kremlin.
“We couldn’t have said it better ourselves,”
El-Hage said in response to Russia’s decision. He added:
“By criminalising our organization — even threatening with imprisonment those who collaborate with us — for having a research project that documents how President Vladimir Putin’s dictatorship is a ‘fully authoritarian regime,’ the Kremlin does nothing but confirm our assessment.”
The statement captures the central confrontation between HRF and the Russian government. The foundation presents its work as independent documentation of authoritarian governance and human-rights violations. Moscow portrays the same work as hostile political activity conducted on behalf of foreign powers.
Thus, the problem at hand is not only the legality of operating in Russia by the foreign NGO. It is the question of who determines political reality – independent organizations and international observers or the Russian government. Navalnaya sees the current problem as another element of the overall strategy that Russia employs against her. She had been prosecuted before in a Russian court and put on special Russian registers associated with extremism. In 2024, she was included in the register of financial monitoring of “terrorists and extremists” in Russia.
What the “undesirable” label means
Russia created the “undesirable organisation” mechanism in 2015. Under the law, the Prosecutor General’s Office can declare a foreign or international organisation undesirable if its activities are considered to threaten Russia’s constitutional order, defence capability or national security.
The marking makes it illegal for the organization to operate in Russia. This means that it is now forbidden to carry out any programs, conduct events, give help, raise money or have regular cooperation in the country. The web-sites of the organizations may also be blocked or restricted. Not only the marked organization faces the consequences, but also Russian individuals and organizations will face punishment if they collaborate with the undesirable one. It can mean financial support, participating in events, advocacy, recruitment, raising funds or just giving help. Even sharing articles, videos and other publications of the organization on social media is subject to being regarded as collaboration.
According to the administrative legislation of Russia, the first time of participating in activities of undesirable organizations can be punished by paying fines. Second and further times of taking part in such activities will result in criminal responsibility under article 284.1 of the Criminal Code of Russia.
This creates particular risks for journalists, academics and activists. A Russian reporter who quotes an HRF investigation, a researcher who participates in an HRF discussion or an activist who republishes the foundation’s findings may have to assess whether the material could be interpreted as prohibited cooperation.
The law’s uncertainty is itself an enforcement tool. People may avoid legitimate activity not because they have been prosecuted, but because the potential legal consequences are too serious to risk.
A blacklist that now includes universities
The HRF decision comes after the Russian government placed hundreds of foreign and international organisations on its undesirable list. Available records showed 361 organisations on the list as of June 23, 2026, while official additions published in July pushed the numbering of the register to at least 367.
The list has expanded well beyond opposition groups and foreign-funded NGOs. It now includes international rights organisations, media outlets, journalism networks, foundations, universities and academic research centres.
Amnesty International received a label of undesirability in May 2025. It stated that the Russian government was wrong if they expected the undesirability of Amnesty International to prevent it from documenting the violations of human rights in the country. Human Rights Watch became an undesirable organization in November 2025, after other human rights and press freedom organizations were added to the list. Human Rights Watch stated that the Russian government had already designated at least 280 organizations.
Yale University was included into the list in July 2025. Russian government claimed that the university prepared future leaders of the opposition and participated in the attempts to undermine Russia. Stanford University and its Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies were designated in April 2026. This shows that Russia sees academic cooperation and political research as a potential tool of foreign policy influence.
The inclusion of universities has a wider chilling effect. Russian students, scholars and institutions may fear that cooperation with foreign academic bodies could create legal exposure. Research partnerships, conferences, visiting fellowships and access to foreign publications can all become politically sensitive.
From civil society regulation to repression
The undesirable-organisation law was originally presented by Russian authorities as a national-security measure. Its application, however, has increasingly coincided with the suppression of independent political activity and criticism of the Kremlin.
In 2024, sixty-four organizations were classified as “undesirable” by the Russian government and include Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Belsat, The Moscow Times, Freedom House and Article 19, Human Rights Watch reported. In 2025, there was an increasing trend among prosecutors to prosecute international human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, Reporters Without Borders, the International Federation for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch.
This pattern clearly demonstrates a certain strategy. Instead of just banning local opposition groups, the government tries to cut off Russian citizens from international sources of information, legal aid, investigations and human rights monitoring. It is especially important in view of the shutting down, dissolving and exile of numerous independent Russian organizations. With local organizations being disbanded, the role of international organizations in documenting political trials, prison conditions, enforced disappearance, military abuses and violation of civil liberties becomes more significant.
By criminalising connections with those groups, the Kremlin limits not only the organisations’ ability to work in Russia, but also the ability of Russian citizens to receive and circulate information from abroad.
Political message to Navalnaya and the opposition
The designation carries a clear political message to Navalnaya. It tells Russian citizens that engagement with an organisation she leads can be treated as a state-security offence.
Navalnaya has tried to maintain the international image of the opposition movement which is led by her husband. Her activities have entailed appeals for putting pressure on Russian officials, supporting democratic movements, and keeping the international community concerned about political oppression in Russia. The reaction of the Kremlin has been the interpretation of such activities as the work of the foreign subversive group. In this way, any political opposition turns into the legal matter since the opponents are not only those who disagree but are also the members of a hostile foreign group. It also puts Russians living abroad under pressure because the law may be applied to citizens, media, and activists working abroad provided that they have connections with the organizations blacklisted by Moscow.
What the decision means
The designation of HRF is unlikely to stop the foundation’s work from abroad. HRF does not depend on a formal presence in Russia to publish research, support activists or advocate sanctions. In practical terms, the decision may instead make the foundation’s reports more difficult to access inside Russia and increase the risks faced by Russians who use them.
The Kremlin’s action also risks reinforcing HRF’s central argument. By criminalising a foreign organisation for describing Russia as fully authoritarian, Moscow demonstrates the narrow space available for independent assessments of the Russian political system.
The immediate impact is going to be legal ambiguity and even more pressure on Russian civil society. The longer-term impact is going to be a deeper divide between Russians and the international organizations of rights, universities, and media organizations. As HRF joins Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Yale University, Stanford and other media organizations on an increasingly long list, it is safe to conclude that this move fits into a systematic campaign.
Russia is not only banning specific organizations, but it is building a legal structure to insulate its people from any independent organizations which contest its narrative. In the case of Yulia Navalnaya, it is yet another effort to criminalize the continuation of her late husband’s political legacy on an international level. For the Kremlin, it means a signal that any human rights documentation, promotion of sanctions, or opposition-related research is a threat to state power. For Russians who deal with those organizations, it is an indication that even disseminating of information can become criminal.