History was created in Bangladesh when the administration of Sheikh Hasina was ousted by massive demonstrations in 2024. The rise of a Nobel Peace laureate Muhammad Yunus to become the head of an interim government brought with it a new dawn of democratic restoration and protection of human rights. Nonetheless, almost 1 year into this period of transition, there seems to have been a slackening of reform with institutional fixity, political counterattack, and continued authoritarian frameworks as major obstacles.
The widening difference between the promises and realization has led to the complexities of shifting a regime control system into an actual transformation towards democracy as Bangladesh enters into general elections in 2026.
Early efforts and unfinished agendas
From protest aftermath to transitional authority
The interim government was formed after one of the bloodiest internal revolts in the current history of Bangladesh. Estimates of United Nations Human Rights Council reflected that more than 1400 civilians were killed in May to August of the year 2024, some of them being minor, when police and paramilitary personnel were found shooting at demonstrators and unarmed protesters seeking accountability in the political process. This was the spill-over that resulted in the resignation of Prime Minister Hasina who had reigned for over 15 years.
Once taking up power at its head, the Yunus leadership introduced prisoners amnesty, as well as political amnesty of the political prisoners immediately, and gave promises of a systemic change. However, there were fissures of mistrust in the early days of goodwill. Human Rights Watch showed regular arbitrary arrest of political oppositionists of the Awami League on amended laws about countering terrorism. Furthermore, the eleven reform commissions that were initiated to work on issues of policing, independence of the judiciary, electoral transparency, minority rights have not provided binding action by mid-2025 due to resistance at the bureaucratic level and the uncooperative nature of the institutions.
Unreformed security architecture
A central obstacle is the enduring power of Bangladesh’s security establishment. The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), linked to extrajudicial killings and widely sanctioned internationally, remains functional. Though the government promised structural review, no dismantlement or accountability measures have materialized.
Evidence destruction linked to past disappearances and state-sponsored killings continues. Human rights advocates argue this reflects a continuity of impunity. Without firm executive resolve to constrain state security forces, democratic consolidation risks remaining superficial.
Political restriction and social repression
Opposition targeting and ambiguous legality
The interim government’s decision to impose a “temporary” ban on the Awami League under new national security provisions remains controversial. Over 600 political figures from the former ruling party remain in detention. Several have accused the authorities of denying due process, access to counsel, and medical assistance.
Legal scholars contend the line between security and political suppression is increasingly blurred. The amended laws under which the ban is enforced grant the government sweeping powers to define and detain perceived threats, undermining pluralist democracy.
Media intimidation and minority marginalization
Freedom of expression, another benchmark of democratic health, faces parallel setbacks. Despite partial unbanning of independent newspapers, investigative journalists continue to report physical attacks, online harassment, and state surveillance.
The situation is similarly bleak for minority communities. In July 2025, the Hindu-majority village of Thakurpara in Rangpur faced a communal mob attack destroying fourteen homes. In the Chittagong Hill Tracts, indigenous residents report continued land seizures, harassment, and lack of state protection.
These episodes underscore structural discrimination that survives regime change and threatens the fabric of inclusive governance.
Institutional accountability and justice mechanisms
Flaws in transitional justice efforts
Despite the formation of a restructured National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), its operational independence remains weak. According to domestic observers, the NHRC continues to be influenced by political considerations, avoiding full pursuit of past crimes.
The reconstituted International Crimes Tribunal also faces criticism. Although empowered to investigate wartime and recent state abuses, it retains the use of capital punishment and suffers procedural lapses. Critics warn this risks transforming transitional justice into political theatre rather than truth-seeking.
Electoral and constitutional reform delays
The Constitutional Reform Commission unveiled a draft reform roadmap in May 2025 focused on depoliticizing election administration, expanding electoral transparency, and introducing affirmative quotas for marginalized communities. Yet partisan deadlock has stalled implementation.
Women’s rights activists highlight that despite vocal support for gender equity, female political participation remains minimal. No binding quota or protective legislation has passed, leaving commitments under UNSC Resolution 1325 unfulfilled.
Stakeholder insights and political realities
This person has spoken on the topic and summarized the situation accordingly: Political analyst Probir Bidhan observed that while Bangladesh’s interim government has created institutional space for reform, systemic inertia and entrenched elite interests persist as formidable barriers. Bidhan stressed that unless external diplomatic encouragement is matched by strong domestic consensus, the path toward real democratization may remain uncertain before the 2026 elections.
International human rights advocates echo these concerns, emphasizing that protection of civil liberties, media independence, and minority safety must move from pledges to tangible guarantees. Many also warn that donor fatigue and declining global media focus may embolden illiberal tendencies under a transitional mask.
Balancing reform ambitions with practical constraints
Bangladesh is presently perched on a fine balance. The end of the rule of Sheikh Hasina did not only mark a political change of power but a popular revolution demanding institutional justice, transparency, and liberty. The interim government was given the mandate to AID NOT prevent this transformation. But its performance indicates that not even a legacy banking system, fears of instability, and partisan mistrust have been able to curb the desire for reform.
The reluctance to reduce the powers accrued by the security organs, the unwillingness to give political opposition, the inability to provide journalists and minorities protection undos the democratic credentials of the government. This carries the threat of repeating the behaviors it was rallying so hard against in 2024 which were authoritarian.
Nevertheless, opportunities are available. By the time the June 2026 national elections take place, domestic and international actors can call on more firm commitments: legal protection, restructuring of security forces, unrestricted political competition, and implementation of institutional changes.
The course Bangladesh continues to follow in the next few months will prove to determine not only the legitimacy of the current leadership of transitioning to democracy, but also whether democratic transformation will successfully occur on the heels of many years of autocratic rule. The answer will depend on whether political expediency or principled reform ultimately shapes the country’s post-Hasina future.