Court remands Bauchi Finance Commissioner over terror financing charges

Court remands Bauchi Finance Commissioner over terror financing charges

The Federal High Court in Abuja remanded Bauchi State Commissioner of Finance Yakubu Adamu and three co-defendants in prison custody on December 31, 2025, following their arraignment by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) on charges of terrorism financing and money laundering involving approximately $9.7 million. Justice Emeka Nwite presided over the case, marked FHC/ABJ/CR/705/2025, where the defendants Yakubu Adamu, Balarabe Abdullahi Ilelah, Aminu Mohammed Bose, and Kabiru Yahaya Mohammed faced a 10-count charge sheet filed on December 30, 2025. The court ordered their remand pending a bail ruling scheduled for January 5, 2026, highlighting the gravity of the allegations tied to state government funds disbursed between January and May 2024.

This development underscores escalating scrutiny on public officials in northern Nigeria amid broader national efforts to combat illicit financing networks. The EFCC alleges the funds, approved by Bauchi State Governor Bala Mohammed, were released in cash to Bello Bodejo, leader of Miyetti Allah, and associates, purportedly for purposes that included supporting terrorist activities. Such cases reflect Nigeria’s intensified legal push against financial crimes linked to insecurity, with the judiciary playing a pivotal role in enforcement.

Defendants’ profiles

Yakubu Adamu serves as Bauchi State’s Commissioner for Finance, a key position overseeing budgetary allocations and financial transactions for the state government. His co-defendants include Balarabe Abdullabi Ilelah, Aminu Mohammed Bose, and Kabiru Yahaya Mohammed, identified as civil servants and signatories to state government accounts or payment instruments. Fugitives mentioned in the charges, such as Sirajo Jaja (former Accountant-General) and Samaila Irmiya Liman, add layers to the alleged conspiracy.

These individuals occupy strategic roles in Bauchi’s fiscal administration, raising questions about internal oversight mechanisms within state ministries. Adamu’s prominence as a commissioner amplifies the case’s political resonance, potentially implicating higher governance structures. Their professional backgrounds in finance and public service position them at the intersection of legitimate state expenditures and alleged illicit diversions.

Specific allegations

Count one accuses the defendants of conspiring to provide $2.3 million in cash to Bello Bodejo and associates, funded via approvals from Governor Bala Mohammed, for terrorism financing between January and May 2024, violating Section 26(1) and punishable under Section 21(2)(a) of the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022. Additional counts detail Adamu receiving $6.95 million in cash outside financial institutions, contravening Sections 2(1), 19(1)(d), and 19(2)(b) of the Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022. The total scheme spans $9.7 million, involving multiple transactions purportedly linked to terrorist groups.

Prosecutor Samuel Chime presented the charges, emphasizing non-institutional cash handling and conspiratorial intent. References to Miyetti Allah leader Bello Bodejo suggest ties to vigilante or herder groups accused of insurgent affiliations. These specifics portray a pattern of state resources allegedly funneled through unofficial channels, blending money laundering with terrorism support.

Legal framework

Nigeria’s Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022, under Section 21(2)(a), penalizes financing terrorists with up to 10 years imprisonment or life for severe cases, targeting acts like providing funds knowingly or suspiciously. Complementing this, the Money Laundering Act, 2022, prohibits cash transactions exceeding thresholds without banking, with Section 19 imposing harsh penalties for evasion. The Federal High Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over such federal offenses ensures specialized handling.

EFCC’s role as lead agency stems from its mandate under the EFCC Act, 2004, to probe economic crimes, often collaborating with security services on terror finance. Bail considerations weigh flight risk, evidence tampering, and public safety, justifying remand here. This framework aligns with international standards like FATF recommendations, pressuring Nigeria to dismantle terror funding pipelines.

Court proceedings

On December 31, 2025, the Federal High Court in Abuja, presided over by Justice Emeka Nwite, formally arraigned Bauchi State Commissioner of Finance Yakubu Adamu alongside co-defendants Balarabe Abdullahi Ilelah, Aminu Mohammed Bose, and Kabiru Yahaya Mohammed on a 10-count charge of terrorism financing and money laundering. EFCC prosecutor Samuel Chime presented the charge sheet, marked FHC/ABJ/CR/705/2025, urging the court to take the defendants’ pleas immediately to expedite proceedings amid allegations involving $9.7 million in state funds disbursed between January and May 2024. 

However, a prior scheduling conflict in the case file, specifically the absence of the formal charge document at the initial listing necessitated a postponement, preventing plea entry on that day and safeguarding procedural fairness. Justice Nwite, exercising judicial discretion typical in sensitive national security matters, ordered the remand of all four defendants to the Kuje Correctional Centre in Abuja, emphasizing the need to preserve evidence integrity during ongoing investigations. 

The court fixed January 5, 2026, as the date for hearing bail applications, allowing defense counsel time to review the voluminous proof of evidence while balancing public safety concerns linked to terrorism charges. No pleas were recorded, a standard practice that upholds defendants’ rights under Nigeria’s Criminal Procedure Act, ensuring they are not prejudiced before full disclosure of prosecution materials.

Broader implications

The case involving Bauchi State Commissioner of Finance Yakubu Adamu and his co-defendants on terrorism financing charges carries profound broader implications for Nigeria’s governance, security, and economic landscape. At its core, it lays bare systemic vulnerabilities in state-level financial controls, where approvals for multimillion-dollar cash disbursements bypassed institutional safeguards, highlighting a dangerous nexus between public funds and illicit networks. This exposure risks eroding public trust in northern governance structures, already strained by persistent banditry, insurgency, and herder-farmer conflicts in the North-East and North-West regions. 

The alleged linkage to Miyetti Allah leader Bello Bodejo reignites long-standing debates over vigilante groups’ dual roles as community protectors and potential enablers of terror activities, such as those associated with Boko Haram or ISWAP affiliates. Such associations pressure federal-state relations, compelling Abuja to assert dominance over resource allocation amid accusations of complicity or negligence at the gubernatorial level under Bauchi’s administration led by Governor Bala Mohammed. 

Under President Donald Trump’s re-elected administration, which has emphasized robust anti-terrorism partnerships with African nations including intelligence sharing and financial sanctions—this incident could invite heightened U.S. scrutiny, potentially affecting bilateral aid or designating linked entities as terror financiers, further straining Nigeria’s diplomatic balancing act.